We report the 1st example of a true complementarity effect in memory development-a situation in which memory for the same event simultaneously becomes more and less accurate between early childhood and adulthood. We investigated this paradoxical effect because fuzzy-trace theory predicts that it can occur in paradigms that produce developmental reversals in false memory, which are circumstances in which adults are more likely than children to remember new events as old. The complementarity prediction is this: If subjects separately judge whether those same events are new but similar to old ones, adults will be more accurate than children, even though adults are less accurate when they judge whether the items are old. We report 4 experiments in which children (6-and 10-year-olds), adolescents (14-year-olds), and adults encoded the modal developmental reversal materials: DeeseϪRoedigerϪMc-Dermott lists. Then, they responded to memory tests on which half the subjects judged whether test items were old and half judged whether the same items were newϪsimilar. The paradoxical complementarity effect was detected in all experiments: The tendency to falsely remember newϪsimilar items as being old increased with development, but so did the tendency to correctly remember them as being newϪsimilar.
Developmental reversals in false memory are compelling illustrations of the paradoxical nature of human cognition. They are instances in which the baseline tendency to falsely remember events that did not happen is not only high, but it increases during normal development. Also, net accuracy (the ratio of true to false memory) may even decline. These phenomena are puzzling from many points of view. For example, they violate a core principle of cognitive development, the law of positive progression ; they run counter to the familiar rule that differentiating reality from fantasy is more difficult for children than for adults (Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, 2011) ; and they challenge polices that govern how the courts interpret the reliability of children's memory reports (Klemfuss & Ceci, 2012) .
In this article, we report that developmental reversals are even more counterintuitive than currently supposed because they also violate a principle of logical coherence, which stipulates that memory is compensatory across mutually incompatible reality states. Two reality states are incompatible if an object or event cannot belong to both of them simultaneously. For instance, following the encoding phase of a memory experiment, a test item cannot have been presented and not presented; it must be one or the other. The compensation principle merely states that if the tendency to remember that an item belongs to a specific state (say, "presented") increases with development, the tendency to remember that it belongs to some logically incompatible state (say, "not presented") must decrease.
Compensation means that memory development is logically coherent: Increased memory for one reality state is coupled with decreased memory for other, incompatible states. The alternative to compensation, developmental complementarity, troubles one's intuition greatly. Complementarity means that the tendency to remember mutually incompatible states increases with development, so that logical coherence degrades. In the experiments reported here, the false memory phenomenon that has dominated developmental reversal research, the DeeseϪRoedigerϪMcDer-mott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) illusion, exhibits precisely this pattern. Before presenting the experiments, we sketch some salient features of prior research that place this pattern in context. erman, 1992, 1994) , for live event sequences (Pipe, Gee, Wilson, & Egerton, 1999; Poole & White, 1991) , for metaphorical statements (Reyna & Kiernan, 1995) , for mathematics problems (Brainerd & Gordon, 1994) , for word lists (Bjorklund & Muir, 1988) , and even for nonsense rhymes (Brainerd, Stein, & Reyna, 1998) . Similarly, declines in implanted false memories have been reported using paradigms as varied as memory for forced confabulations (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998) , for traumatic experiences (Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, & Kuhn, 1994) , for crime videos (Bjorklund, Bjorklund, Brown, & Cassel, 1998) , for physical and emotional pain (Bruck, Ceci, Francoeur, & Barr, 1995) , and for quasisexual events (Poole & Lindsay, 1995) . Taken together, such findings made the developmental decline rule seem very secure (see various chapters in Bjorklund, 2000) .
Appearances were deceiving, however. and Ceci and Bruck (1998) were the first to show that fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) predicts that false memories can actually increase with age when they have two properties: (a) Distortion is rooted in comprehending and connecting the semantic content of experience and (b) it is difficult to use verbatim memory for actual events to suppress false memories. Brainerd and Mojardin (1998) confirmed that prediction with a paradigm in which false memory was driven by connecting narrative gist across sentences (property a) whose surface forms were so similar that it was difficult to tell exactly which ones had been presented (property b). Soon, several investigators noticed that the paradigm in Table 1 , the DRM illusion, has these same two properties, and they found that the illusion intensifies throughout childhood and adolescence (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Howe, 2005) . In the DRM procedure, subjects encode lists of related words and respond to recognition tests containing three types of probes: old (O) list words, newϪsimilar (NS) words, and newϪdifferent (ND) words (cf. Table 1 ). The task is simply to judge whether each probe is old, with old judgments about O, NS, and ND items' being classified as true memories, false memories, and response bias, respectively.
To date, developmental reversals have been detected with an array of paradigms, including memory for categorized photographs (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004) , for historical text (Fazio & Marsh, 2008) , for pictures of familiar objects (Ceci, Papierno, & Kulkofsky, 2007) , for play sessions (Connolly & Price, 2006) , for emotional facial expressions (Fernández-Dols, Carrera, Barchard, & Gacitua, 2008) , for emotional words (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010) , for causal inferences (Lyons, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2010) , for everyday activities (Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016) , and for rumors (Principe, Guiliano, & Root, 2008) . However, the DRM illusion has remained the workhorse, with roughly two thirds of published experiments' having relied on it (see , Table 1 ). There are sound practical reasons for this: The paradigm combines high efficiency in false memory production with great simplicity, adaptability, and ease of application with children.
The large archive of DRM research demonstrates that as development unfolds, NS items are increasingly misremembered as being what they are not (old) rather than what they are (newϪ similar), and by early adulthood, false memory for NS items approaches true memory for O items. It is well established that the magnitude of this trend is influenced by many theoretically motivated manipulations (for a review, see Brainerd et al., 2011) . A few illustrations are encouraging subjects to encode semantic relations (Lampinen, Leding, Reed, & Odegard, 2006; Odegard, Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2008) , increasing the examples of those relations (Sugrue & Hayne, 2006) , providing more time to encode list words (Carneiro & Fernandez, 2010) , interfering with encoding by dividing attention (Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012) , binding list words together with narratives (Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007) , binding list words together with emotional relations (e.g., Howe, 2007) , comparing subjects who differ in semantic ability (Weekes, Hamilton, Oakhill, & Holliday, 2008) , and comparing subjects who differ in clinical conditions that affect semantic processing (Goodman et al., 2011) .
The Present Study
The standard interpretation of developmental reversals in the DRM illusion is that as the brain matures, NS items such as cold and anger are increasingly perceived as having actually been presented Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Donohue, Goodman, & Bunge, 2008) . If so, it follows from the compensation principle that the tendency to correctly perceive that NS items are newϪsimilar must decline with development. However, FTT makes the paradoxical prediction that it can increase (i.e., complementarity). Complementarity effects first became prominent in physics, where they refer to situations in which incompatible empirical states are detected for the same system when each state is measured separately (e.g., Gerlach & Stern, 1922) . In the present case, complementarity can result from gist memory, as follows.
FTT assumes that the brain stores dissociated verbatim and gist traces of experience that capture, respectively, events' surface form and semantic content, especially meaning connections among events (e.g., items on the anger list are names of emotions). In false memory studies, verbatim traces support true memory for O items and suppress false memory for NS items, whereas gist traces support both false memory for NS items and true memory for O Note. Subjects study short word lists composed of related items, such as those in the left-hand column, and they respond to a recognition test on which three types of test probes are presented: O words, NS words, and ND words. For each test probe, the subjects' task is to decide whether it is an O word. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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items (Abadie, Waroquier, & Terrier, 2017; Barrouillet, 2015; Bouwmeester & Verkoeijen, 2010; Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014; . In other words, verbatim traces are compensatory across incompatible reality states (support one, reject the other), but gist traces are complementary (support both; Brainerd, Wang, Reyna, & Nakamura, 2015) . In addition to FTT, other explanations of developmental reversals in the DRM illusion were proposed after reversals were reported (see Howe, 2006; Metzger et al., 2008) . However, FTT makes the even more paradoxical complementarity prediction, which does not follow from these later hypotheses. Developmental complementarity falls out of the effects that verbatim and gist memory have when the memory task is changed so that subjects must remember NS items and avoid falsely remembering O and ND items. Now, verbatim traces support true memory for NS items and suppress false memory for O items, whereas gist traces support both true memory for NS items and false memory for O items (Brainerd & Reyna, 2018) . When performance is dominated by gist, then, whether memory for NS items is true or false depends on whether the old or the newϪsimilar reality state is tested (Brainerd et al., 2015) . Therefore, we modified the usual DRM design slightly, so that subjects judged whether NS items (e.g., cold) were newϪsimilar, as well as whether they were old. What should development look like?
Remembering NS items to be old on old tests and to be new on newϪsimilar tests is logically contradictory, of course, and hence, one's natural intuition is that development must be compensatory-that cold will be progressively less likely to be remembered as new because it is already known from developmental reversal studies that it is progressively more likely to be remembered as old. This would mean that although false memories increase with age, at least memory is becoming more logically consistent. According to FTT, however, the noncompensatory nature of gist means that development may not be logically consistent either: Developmental improvements in gist memory make both old and newϪsimilar seem like accurate descriptions of cold.
We investigated whether our natural intuition or the theoretical prediction is correct by determining whether, as false memory for NS items increases, true memory for them decreases (compensation) or increases (complementarity). A further theoretical prediction is that developmental complementarity should be specific to NS items and not extend to O items. Here, research has shown that memory for items that are actually encoded is usually dominated by verbatim retrieval (e.g., Abadie et al., 2017; Bouwmeester, & Verkoeijen, 2010) , and as we saw, verbatim memory, unlike gist, is compensatory across tests for mutually incompatible reality states.
We report four experiments in which subjects of different ages encoded DRM lists and responded to memory tests on which they made memory judgments about O, NS, and ND items, with half the subjects making traditional old judgments and half making newϪsimilar judgments. Four experiments were included to ensure the replicability and generality of what is, after all, a counterintuitive effect. We tracked developmental trends in accuracy for NS items like those in the middle column of Table 1 and for O items like those in the left-hand column, between early childhood and adolescence (Experiment 1) and between early childhood and young adulthood (Experiments 2-4).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 implemented the most commonly used methodology in prior research and covered the age range that has typically been studied. Subjects from three age levels (6-, 10-, and 14-yearolds) were exposed to several DRM lists, followed by recognition tests on which there were three types of items: O, NS, and ND. Relative to most developmental DRM studies, Experiment 1 had two novel features. First and most important, there were two distinct testing conditions. Half of the subjects at each age level participated in a standard O? condition, in which the task was to decide whether each test item was old. The other half participated in an NS? condition, in which the task was to decide whether each test item was newϪsimilar. It should be noted that child NS? tests were developed some years ago by , and in prior developmental research, children as young as 5Ϫ7 have performed accurately on such tests Brainerd, Reyna, & Holliday, 2012; Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2009 ). However, our design included manipulation checks to ensure that.
The other novel feature of Experiment 1 is that the memory tests included both types of NS items that are shown in the middle column of Table 1 -namely, strong ones (e.g., cold, sleep, and anger), which produce high levels of DRM false memory in adults, and weak ones (e.g., frost, yawn, and mean), which produce more modest levels. Most DRM studies include only strong NS items, but notice that weak NS items share semantic content with list items. Consequently, FTT predicts the same qualitative trends for both; that is, developmental reversals should occur for weak as well as strong NS items, and developmental complementarity can occur for both.
Method
Subjects. The subjects in Experiment 1 were 65 first-grade children (M age ϭ 6 years 7 months), 64 fifth-grade children (M age ϭ 10 years 9 months), and 64 ninth-grade adolescents (M age ϭ 14 years, 5 months). The choice of sample size was based on a statistical power analysis of prior developmental DRM experiments that the authors have reported. The analysis showed that sample sizes of 40 per age level would yield a power of 1 Ϫ ␤ ϭ .8 to detect moderate-sized effects for the between-subjects factors of age and condition.
The subjects were recruited from public schools that served middle class residential areas in the United Kingdom, and their participation was secured via letters of parental permission. Subjects from each age level were randomly assigned to the O? condition or to the NS? condition, with the restriction that conditions should contain equal numbers of male and female subjects. The research ("Development of False Memory") was classified as exempt by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Kent because it involved simple behavioral testing, which consisted of studying word lists and responding to yesϪno memory questions.
Materials. The words for the study lists and memory tests in all four experiments were drawn from a normed pool of 55 DRM lists, each of which consists of the first 15 forward associates of a missing item (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001 ). These missing items are the ones that are designated as strong NS in Table 1 . The lists are ranked according to the levels of false This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
memory that they produce for missing items (i.e., judging those items to be O). We selected as the study lists for all four experiments the nine that produce the highest levels of false memory in these norms (the missing items were anger, cold, cup, sleep, smell, soft, sweet, window, and wish) . Four additional lists were used as sources of items for the instructions and practice tests. The first 12 words from each of the nine DRM lists formed the lists that were presented to the subjects at each age level. The lists were presented in three cycles of three lists per cycle, with a memory test following each cycle of three lists. On the memory test that followed each cycle of three DRM lists, there were 19 test probes: three words from each of the three lists, the three missing words (strong NS items), one word that was selected from among the three unpresented words for each list (weak NS items), and four words drawn from the 38 DRM lists that were not used as either study lists or as sources of items for the instructions and practice tests and were randomly selected for each subject in each experiment (ND items). The ND items were controls for wellknown developmental differences in response bias (e.g., Brainerd & Mojardin, 1998) . Thus, over the three cycles, the three test lists contained a total of 27 O words and 30 new words (nine strong NS, nine weak NS, and 12 ND).
Procedures. Participating schools set aside quiet rooms where the research was conducted. Subjects were randomly assigned to either the O? or NS? testing condition upon arrival and were informed that they would be exposed to a series of vocabulary lists, after which their memory would be tested. It is important to note that the same instructions and testing procedures were administered to all subjects at all age levels in Experiment 1 and also in Experiments 2-4. Hence, none of the developmental trends that we report can be due to age differences in the instructions or procedures that subjects of different ages received, because there were none.
Subjects sat at a computer, and the experimenter sat nearby. Before any lists were presented, subjects heard the following instructions, via a computer audio recording:
In this study, you will first listen to some lists of vocabulary words. All of them are familiar words that you already know. The lists will be read slowly, one word at a time. Listen to the lists very carefully and pay attention to each word because later on, you will take a memory test. Do you have any questions?
The experimenter then answered any questions. Next, the computer played a recording of three 12-word DRM lists, being read at a rate of 3 s per item in a neutral voice, with a 10-s pause between lists. After the first cycle of lists, subjects listened to instructions for the first memory test.
As mentioned, instructions and procedures for matched O? and NS? conditions were developed by and have been used with children as young as age 5. For subjects who were assigned to the O? condition, the instructions stressed that their task was to accept only old items that had appeared on the lists of vocabulary words. For subjects who were assigned to the NS? condition, the instructions stressed that their task was to accept only new words that had the same meaning as old words. The instructions for each condition provided subjects with multiple examples of the each of the three types of items that were to be accepted and rejected, items that were drawn from short practice lists (four words) that were presented as part of the instructions. Also as part of the instructions, subjects were required to pass a practice test to demonstrate their understanding and to show that they could apply the instructions on a memory test. Specifically, a short practice list was presented, after which six test probes (two O items, two NS items, and two ND items) were presented. Subjects received feedback for their responses to each probe. Those who responded correctly to all test probes continued to the main memory test for their condition. Those who made one or more errors received a second practice list and a second practice test. Subjects who failed to perform perfectly on the second practice test were dropped from the experiment. Only three subjects had to be dropped, all of them 6-year-olds.
The main memory test followed successful completion of the practice test. First, subjects listened to an audio recording of instructions that reminded them of how to respond by pressing the Y key on the computer keyboard for items that they wanted to accept or pressing the N key for items that they wanted to reject. Subjects then listened to a computer file of the test items being read in random order. The test was self-paced; the recording did not advance to the next item until subjects had responded Y or N to the current item. There were two more cycles of three DRM lists, followed by reminder test instructions, followed by a selfpaced memory test. The practice test was eliminated from the instructional phase of the second and third cycles.
Results
Before reporting the results, we emphasize that it is always necessary to correct raw recognition data such as these for response bias, because as mentioned earlier, levels of yea-saying bias vary developmentally. That was true in the present experiment because false alarm rates for ND items declined steadily with age in both testing conditions, demonstrating higher bias at younger age levels. The three most common methods of correcting data such as ours for response bias are the two-high-threshold statistic P r and the signal detection statistics A= and d=. (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . These statistics usually produce the same qualitative results (Brainerd et al., 2015) , and consequently, we report results using only the first correction method, P r . This statistic has the conceptual virtue that corrected scores are probability values rather than dimensionless proportions (A=) or Gaussian random variables (d=). However, all of the statistical analyses that we report were also conducted for A= and d= scores, and none of the findings changed.
The mean bias-corrected correct response probabilities for O, strong NS, and weak NS items are reported in Table 2 for the O? and NS? conditions, and the ND false alarm rates that were used in making these corrections may be found in Table 3 . As manipulation checks, notice that in the O? condition the usual developmental reversal pattern is present for strong NS items and that true memory (accepting O items) also increased between early childhood and adolescence. As another manipulation check, recall that even the youngest children understood the instructions and could execute them on memory tests because they could not participate in the main memory tests unless they performed perfectly on the practice test. Nevertheless, it might be thought that because the NS? instructions, are atypical, the youngest children might have been unable to execute them during the main tests. That hypothesis can be tested by comparing these children's performance in the NS? condition versus the O? condition. Note that if 6-year-olds This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
understood and could implement the instructions, the probability of accepting O items should be higher in the O? condition than in the NS? condition, whereas the opposite should be true for NS Figure 1A , where correct response probabilities in the O? condition (black data points) and the NS? condition (white data points) are plotted for both strong and weak NS items. It can be seen that the developmental trend for these false memory items is not the intuitive compensation pattern, in which NS accuracy would decline with age in both the O? and NS? conditions. Instead, it is the paradoxical complementarity pattern, in which accuracy simultaneously decreases (in the O? condition) and increases (in the NS? condition). In contrast, a different pattern can be seen in Figure 1B for Note. Old items appeared on the DeeseϪRoedigerϪMcDermott (DRM) lists, whereas strong newϪsimilar items and weak newϪsimilar items did not appear on DRM lists. The O? and NS? testing conditions ask, respectively, whether a test item is an old-list item and whether it is a newϪ similar item. In the O? testing condition, the correct response is acceptance for old items but rejection for strong newϪsimilar items and weak newϪ similar items. In the NS? testing condition, the correct response is rejection for old items but acceptance for strong newϪsimilar items and weak newϪsimilar items. The correct response probabilities for old, strong newϪsimilar, and weak newϪsimilar test items have been corrected for yea-saying bias with the two-high-threshold method. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
O items. There, the intuitive compensation pattern is present: Memory for list words becomes more accurate with age in both conditions. To test the complementarity pattern in Figure 1A for statistical reliability, we computed a 3 (age: 6, 10, and 14 year olds) ϫ 2 (condition: O? vs. NS?) ϫ 2 (type of item: strong NS vs. weak NS) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of bias-corrected correct response probabilities for NS items. The first two factors were betweensubjects, and the third was within-subject. If it were true that development is complementary for NS items but compensatory for O items, there would be an Age ϫ Condition crossover interaction. The specific form of this interaction must be that accuracy decreases with age in the O? condition, whereas it increases with age in the NS? condition. There was a robust crossover of just that sort, F(2, 187) ϭ 178.55, MSE ϭ .06, p 2 ϭ .49. Post hoc tests (Tukey's honestly significant difference [HSD] ) confirmed what is visually apparent in Figure 1A : In the O? condition, accuracy decreased reliably between the ages of 6 and 10 and between the ages of 10 and 14, but in the NS? condition, accuracy increased reliably between the ages of 6 and 10 and between the ages of 10 and 14. With development, then, subjects became better at correctly recognizing that NS items were newϪsimilar, whereas they simultaneously become worse at correctly recognizing that NS items were not old. There was also a Condition ϫ Type of Item interaction, F(1, 187) ϭ 47.38, MSE ϭ .03, p 2 ϭ .19. Here, post hoc tests revealed something that is also visually apparent in Figure 1A : Accuracy was higher for strong than for weak items in the NS? condition, but it was lower for strong than for weak items in the O? condition.
Turning to the statistical reliability of the developmental trend for O items (see Figure 1B) , recall that theory expects that items that were actually presented on lists will exhibit compensation rather than complementarity, for reasons that are concerned with verbatim memory: Memory for list words relies predominantly on verbatim traces, which are compensatory-for O items, they support correct acceptance of O? probes and correct rejection of NS? probes (see also Brainerd et al., 2015) . It can be seen in Figure 1B that this prediction, too, was confirmed. Statistically, the patterns in Figure 1B mean that an Age ϫ Condition ANOVA of performance on O items should produce a main effect of condition but not an Age ϫ Condition crossover, because accuracy is simply improving with age in both the O? and NS? conditions. There was indeed a main effect for condition, F(1, 187) ϭ 230.49, MSE ϭ .0, p 2 ϭ .55, p Ͻ .0001, and there was not an Age ϫ Condition crossover. There was an Age ϫ Condition interaction of another sort, however, F(2, 187) ϭ 20.83, MSE ϭ .04, p 2 ϭ .22, p Ͻ .0001. It was a divergent fan in which the difference between p(O?) and p(NS?) was smaller for 6-year-olds than for 10-yearolds (⌬ 6 ϭ .17 and ⌬ 10 ϭ .44) and was smaller for 10-year-olds than for 14-year-olds (⌬ 10 ϭ .44 and ⌬ 14 ϭ .68). In short, with development, subjects became progressively better at remembering that O items were old and that they were not newϪsimilar, which means that the level of logical inconsistency was increasing.
Experiments 2-4
It is well established that the DRM illusion exhibits counterintuitive developmental reversals-that with age, subjects make fewer correct responses to memory probes that ask whether NS items such as anger and cold are old. Beyond this, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that development is not logically consistent for such items either, because with age, subjects simultaneously make more correct responses to memory probes that ask whether these same items are newϪsimilar. In Experiments 2-4, we attempted to replicate this paradoxical pattern and, for the sake of generality, to do so in experiments that varied the design of Experiment 1 in two basic ways.
The most significant variation involved the upper end of the age range that was studied. In Experiment 1, the subjects were children and adolescents. However, the developmental reversal effect has also been studied between adolescence and young adulthood (e.g., Odegard et al., 2008) , and this counterintuitive effect continues to grow into the early adult years. It is obviously important to establish whether the same is true of complementarity-that is, whether the age increase in correct responses when memory probes ask whether NS items are newϪsimilar continues into young adulthood. It should, according to the theoretical distinctions that predicted the complementarity pattern. That prediction was based on the growth of gist memory, and it is well established that the ability to form meaning connections among items such as the words on DRM lists improves during the adolescent and the early adult years (e.g., Schneider & Pressley, 1997) . To evaluate that possibility, we extended the age range of Experiment 1 upward to include young adults in Experiments 2-4.
The other design variation involved the method of presenting DRM lists. We implemented the standard oral method in Experiment 1, which results in the highest levels of false memory for NS items on O? probes (Gallo & Roediger, 2002) . Other presentation methods that add visual supports to oral presentations are known to reduce false memory in adults. In particular, three methods of enriching oral presentations with visual supports are known to have this effect-namely, (a) pictures of objects and events named by list words (e.g., Howe, 2006) , (b) printed word stems for list words (e.g., Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2011) , and (c) the full printed versions of list words (e.g., Gallo & Roediger, 2002) . Two of these visual supports, pictures and word stems, have been investigated in developmental studies, and they are known to suppress false memory in children as well as adults (Holliday et al., 2011; Howe, 2006) . They are also known to reduce the magnitude of developmental reversal effects (for a review, see . We used each of these methods in turn in Experiments 2-4. More specifically, the subjects once again received oral presentations of DRM lists, but now they were accompanied by visual depictions (computer screen) of either a picture of the object or action that was named by each word (Experiment 2), a partial printed form of each word (e.g., SN__ for snow; Experiment 3), or the full printed form of each word (Experiment 4).
The motivation for this second design variation, like the first, was theoretical. Presentation formatting manipulations are of theoretical interest because they affect the types of memories that are stored. Because these visual support manipulations decrease the tendency to falsely accept O? probes for NS items, the traditional explanation is that they increase verbatim memory, relative to gist memory (Holliday et al., 2011) . The fact that they shrink but do not eliminate developmental reversals is explained in the same way (Holliday et al., 2011) . This leads to an interesting prediction about subjects' responses to NS items on complementary NS? probes. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
We saw that the theoretical distinctions that predict developmental reversals also say that verbatim memory can be used to correctly accept such probes (e.g., "Anger is definitely new because I clearly remember hearing mad, fear, and hate."). Consequently, these visual support manipulations should increase correct acceptances of NS? probes as they decrease false acceptances of O? probes, especially at older age levels, where both acceptance probabilities are high.
Method
Subjects. A total of 607 subjects participated in these three experiments. The subjects in Experiment 2 were 50 first-grade children (M age ϭ 6 years 4 months), 50 fifth-grade children (M age ϭ 10 year 11 months), 50 ninth-grade adolescents (M age ϭ 14 years 9 months), and 56 undergraduates (M age ϭ 20 years 1 month). The subjects in Experiment 3 were 46 first-grade children (M age ϭ 6 years 8 months), 44 fifth-grade children (M age ϭ 10 years 7 months), 49 ninth-grade adolescents (M age ϭ 14 years 5 months), and 56 undergraduates (M age ϭ 20 years 2 months). The subjects in Experiment 4 were 50 first-grade children (M age ϭ 6 year 10 months), 50 fifth-grade children (M age ϭ 10 years 6 months), 50 ninth-grade adolescents (M age ϭ 14 years 11 months), and 56 undergraduates (M age ϭ 20 years 10 months). The choice of sample size was based on a statistical power analysis of prior developmental DRM experiments that the authors have reported. The analysis showed that sample sizes of 40 per age level would yield a power of 1 Ϫ ␤ ϭ .8 to detect moderate-sized effects for the between-subjects factors of age and condition.
As in Experiment 1, the subjects at the three youngest age levels in Experiments 2-4 were recruited from public schools that served middle class residential areas in the United Kingdom, and their participation was secured via letters of parental permission. The subjects at the oldest age level in these experiments were undergraduate volunteers who participated to fulfill a course requirement. As in Experiment 1, the subjects from each age level in Experiments 2-4 were randomly assigned to the O? or NS? condition, with the restriction that each condition should contain equal numbers of male and female subjects. The research was classified as exempt by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Kent because it involved simple behavioral testing, which consisted of studying word lists and responding to yesϪno memory questions.
Materials and procedures. For the subjects at the three youngest age levels in these experiments, as in Experiment 1, the research was conducted in their schools, in quiet rooms that had been designated for this purpose. For the adults in each experiment, the research was conducted in university laboratories. The materials and procedures for each experiment were the same as in Experiment 1, except for two changes. The first was that during presentation of DRM lists, the oral administration procedure of Experiment 1 was supplemented with visual depictions of the items on a computer screen. As the subjects sat in front of the computer monitor listening to the DRM lists, they viewed visual depictions of the individual items, which were synchronized with the audio recordings. At the start of the experiment, subjects received the same general instructions as in Experiment 1, but the instructions also informed them as to the nature of the depictions that they would view. In Experiment 2, the subjects were told they would view pictures of objects or actions referred to by each word. These were large pictures that appeared in the center of the screen. In Experiment 3, the subjects were told that they would view a few letters from the printed form of each word, such as __ar, for fear. __te, for hate, and __mper for temper. These word stems were printed in lowercase 72-point font and centered on the screen. In Experiment 4, the subjects were told that they would view the full printed form of each word, which was presented in lowercase 72-point font, centered on the screen.
The second change was to reduce the length of the procedure. In Experiment 1, the subjects received three cycles of three DRM lists followed by a 25-item self-paced memory test (nine O, three strong NS, three weak NS, 10 ND), for a total of 75 test items. At different points during the second half of the procedure, some of the youngest children stated that they were becoming fatigued. Although those children's performance did not differ from that of other children, we decided to shorten the procedure to a single cycle of three DRM lists followed by a single self-paced memory test of 25 items. The three lists that were completed by individual subjects in these experiments were randomly selected from among the 12 lists that were used in Experiment 1. As before, subjects received the instructions that were appropriate to their condition, and they completed a practice test, one on which perfect performance was required to proceed to the main memory test. That main memory tests were identical to those in Experiment 1.
Results
In Table 2 , the mean bias-corrected correct response probabilities for O, strong NS, and weak NS items are reported for the O? and NS? conditions of Experiments 2-4. The ND false alarm probabilities that were used to make these bias corrections are reported in Table 3 . As manipulation checks, notice that in the O? condition of each experiment the usual developmental reversal pattern is present for strong NS items (false alarms increase with age) and that true memory displays the usual developmental improvement (hit rates increase with age). As another manipulation check, recall that even the youngest children in each experiment understood the instructions and could execute them on memory tests because they were required to perform perfectly on practice tests before proceeding. Even the 6-year-olds were able to implement those instructions on the main memory test: A glance at Table 2 reveals that (a) they correctly accepted O items at higher rates in the O? condition than they incorrectly accepted them in the NS? condition and (b) they incorrectly accepted weak NS items at lower rates in the O? condition than they correctly accepted them in the NS? condition.
The important new findings can be seen in Figure 2 . There, correct response probabilities in the O? condition and the NS? condition have been plotted for both strong and weak NS items in Experiment 2 (Panel A), Experiment 3 (Panel B), and Experiment 4 (Panel C). It can be seen that as in Experiment 1, our intuition that the development of false memory would be compensatory across mutually incompatible reality states was violated. Instead, the paradoxical complementarity pattern, in which accuracy simultaneously decreases in the O? condition and increases in the NS? condition, was present in all three experiments. That is, with age, subjects became worse at rejecting the possibility that NS items were old but better at accepting the possibility that they were This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
newϪsimilar. In contrast, also as in Experiment 1, it can be seen in Figure 3 that the O items exhibited the intuitive compensation pattern: Memory for O items became more accurate with development in both the O? and NS? conditions in all three experiments. Because the developmental trends were different for NS versus O items, we report the statistical results for true and false memory separately. We begin with the false memory ANOVAs and then move on to parallel true memory ANOVAs.
False memory.
In each experiment, we tested the complementarity pattern in Figure 2 for statistical reliability by computing a 4 (age: 6, 10, 14, and 20 year olds) ϫ 2 (condition: O? vs. NS?) ϫ 2 (type of item: strong NS vs. weak NS) ANOVA of bias-corrected correct response probabilities for NS items. Recall that if development is complementary rather than compensatory, this ANOVA must yield an Age ϫ Condition crossover, such that accuracy decreases with age in the O? condition but increases with age in the NS? condition. There was a robust crossover of this sort in all three experiments. The detailed results follow.
In Experiment 2, the Age ϫ Condition ϫ Type of Item ANOVA produced a main effect for condition, F(1, 197) ϭ 71.75, MSE ϭ .09, p 2 ϭ .27, p Ͻ .0001, and it also produced the crucial Age ϫ Condition interaction, F(3, 197) ϭ 60.76, MSE ϭ .09, p 2 ϭ .44, p Ͻ .0001. Post hoc analysis (Tukey's HSD) of the interaction confirmed the complementarity pattern that is suggested by the curves in Figure 2A . Specifically, accuracy decreased reliably between age 6 and young adulthood in the O? condition, but it increased reliably in the NS? condition. There was also a small Age ϫ Condition ϫ Type of Item interaction, F(3, 197) Figure 2B -namely, that accuracy decreased reliably between age 6 and young adulthood in the O? condition, but it increased reliably in the NS? condition. The Age ϫ Condition ϫ Type of Item interaction that was detected in Experiment 2 was not present in this experiment.
In Experiment 4, the Age ϫ Condition ϫ Type of Item ANOVA produced a main effect for condition, F(1, 196) ϭ 55.87, MSE ϭ .10, p 2 ϭ .22, p Ͻ .0001, plus the crucial Age ϫ Condition interaction, F(3, 189) ϭ 35.19, MSE ϭ .10, p 2 ϭ .35 p Ͻ .0001. As in all prior experiments, post hoc analysis of the interaction revealed that accuracy decreased reliably between age 6 and young adulthood in the O? condition, but it increased reliably in the NS? condition. The small Age ϫ Condition ϫ Type of Item interaction in Experiment 2 was not detected in this experiment.
Finally, we mentioned that the three visual support manipulations should increase correct acceptances of NS? probes as they decrease false acceptances of O? probes, especially at older age levels, where false acceptance rates are high. We examined this prediction for the 14-year-olds in Experiment 1 (the oldest age level in that experiment) and the 14-year-olds in these experiments. The data were consistent with it. The false acceptance This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
probability for O? probes dropped from .75 in Experiment 1 to an average of .52 in Experiments 2-4, whereas the correct acceptance probability for NS? probes increased from .43 to an average of .55. Both changes were reliable. Summing up, complementarity was the core finding about the development of false memory. In each experiment, for both strong and weak NS items, subjects became progressively better with age at correctly recognizing that NS items were newϪsimilar, but they became progressive worse at correctly recognizing that NS items were not old. In addition, there was always a condition main effect. As can be seen in Figure 2 , this was because at all ages, performance was more accurate on average in the NS? condition than in the O? condition.
True memory. Next, we consider the statistical reliability of the developmental trends for O items that appear in Figure 3 . Theory is known to predict that for items that were actually presented on DRM lists, subjects will exhibit compensation rather than complementarity. That was the pattern observed in all three experiments.
Inspection of the curves in Figure 3 suggests that (a) accuracy improved with age in both conditions and (b) performance was more accurate on average in the O? condition than in the NS? condition. Consistent with that, a 3 (age) ϫ 2 (condition) ANOVA of the bias-corrected correct response probabilities produced a main effect for age in Experiment 2, F(3, 197) 2 ϭ .13, p Ͻ .0001. In short, the developmental trend across all three experiments was the intuitive one for items that had actually been presented. Between early childhood and young adulthood, subjects became progressively better at recognizing that old items were old and that old items were not newϪsimilar. This developmental growth in accuracy was comparable for the two types of remembering because the Age ϫ Condition interaction was not reliable in any of the experiments.
General Discussion
In developmental studies of false memory, principal interest attaches to how accurately subjects of different ages perform on a single type of memory test for a focal class of items. The memory test asks subjects to remember old (O) items and avoid misremembering new items. The focal items are newϪsimilar (NS) ones that preserve some of the salient content of O items, usually their meaning or some contextual details associated with their presentation. In our research, we shifted attention away from this conventional measure of false memory for NS items toward the developmental relation between false and true memory on tests for the logically incompatible old and newϪsimilar reality states. We explored the possibility that this relation violates logical consistency, by exhibiting developmental complementarity rather than developmental compensation. Complementarity was observed with the types of NS items that are administered in the DRM illusion: The tendency to correctly remember them as being newϪsimilar increased as the tendency to incorrectly remember them as old increased.
It is easier to appreciate just how contradictory this is by considering a concrete example that involves the three strong NS items in Table 1 . On the one hand, suppose that one has access to data from only traditional old tests. If so, one would say those data show that anger, cold, and sleep are increasingly perceived as having been presented on DRM lists because they are increasingly accepted as old. This would be the obvious conclusion if only the lower curves in Figures 1A, 2A , 2B, and 2C were available. On the other hand, suppose that one has access to data from only newϪ similar tests. Now, one would say that anger, cold, and sleep are increasingly perceived as having not been presented on DRM lists, because they are increasingly accepted as being newϪsimilar. This would be the obvious conclusion if only the upper curves in Figures 1A, 2A , 2B, and 2C were available.
Because developmental complementarity is a paradoxical result, we sought to generate substantial evidence on whether this pattern may hold for the DRM illusion. Taken as a whole, our findings provide an existence proof of complementarity for this modal developmental reversal paradigm. In Experiment 1, we used the most common methodology for studying the DRM illusion, which is to present lists orally before administering memory tests. We found that between early childhood and mid-adolescence, subjects became progressively better at recognizing that strong and weak NS items were newϪsimilar, but they simultaneously became worse at recognizing that the same items were not old. In Experiments 2-4, we broadened the age range to include young adults, as well as 6-, 10-, and 14-year-olds. We also varied the DRM methodology somewhat by adding three types of visual supports to oral presentations of lists (pictures, word stems, and full printed words), thereby providing a test of the generality of the complementarity pattern in Experiment 1. Visual supports did, indeed, weaken the DRM illusion. For example, among 14-year-olds in Experiment 1, the false acceptance rate on old tests for strong NS items was .74, whereas the corresponding acceptance rates for 14-year-olds in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were .51, .46, and .48, respectively. Nevertheless, developmental complementarity was present in all three experiments, for both strong and weak NS items. A difference between the experiments is that complementarity was more marked for strong than for weak NS items in Experiments 1 and 2 but not in Experiments 3 and 4. This may be due to differences in presentation methods used in these experiments. It also may be due to range restriction, because overall levels of complementarity were lower in Experiments 3 and 4.
Another factor that bears on our level of confidence, in addition to the amount of evidence, is the complementarity pattern, which was not an accidental finding. Rather, this possibility was revealed by the same theoretical machinery that first predicted developmental reversals-namely, FTT's distinctions between dissociated verbatim and gist traces of experience. Both types of representations are interpreted as signs of prior presentation on conventional old tests, but verbatim traces can suppress that tendency for newϪ similar items. FTT treats developmental reversals as situations in which improvements in gist memory increase the tendency to accept NS items as being old, and parallel improvements in verThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
batim memory are ineffective in suppressing this tendency . Another feature of gist, the one that points to complementarity, is that it is a noncompensatory form of memory that is congruent with incompatible reality states (Brainerd et al., 2015) , so that developmental improvements in gist can lead to increased memory for mutually incompatible states. Beyond developmental complementarity for NS items, there is another striking complementarity prediction, which is about developmental trends in overall memory accuracy for the combined data of O and NS items. Based on the results of Experiments 1-4, overall accuracy for the combined data (a) should increase with age when subjects judge whether both types of items are newϪ similar but (b) should decrease with age when they judge whether these same items are old. It is already known that normal memory development can be complementary for NS items and compensatory for O items, and from that fact, overall accuracy for both types of items should decline when subjects judge whether these items are old but should improve when subjects judge whether these same items are newϪsimilar. The results, pooled across the four experiments, are plotted in Figure 4 . As expected, overall accuracy declined between early childhood and young adulthood when subjects judged whether both types of items were old, but overall accuracy improved during the same age range when subjects judged whether both types of items were newϪsimilar. The key implication for understanding memory development is that whether the accuracy of children's memories increases with age is not absolute but, rather, depends upon the reality state that they are asked to remember.
Next, we offer two suggestions about the direction of future research on developmental complementarity. The first is about the DRM illusion, and the second is about other developmental reversal paradigms. With respect to the DRM illusion, we focused on a simple empirical objective in our experiments, which was to generate a substantial amount of data that spanned the early childhood to young adulthood age range. That seemed to be the appropriate first step, considering that complementarity is such a counterintuitive possibility. This focus meant that there was no attempt to test theoretical explanations of complementarity via manipulations that targeted specific processes, such as children's ability to extract the semantic content of DRM lists or preserve verbatim traces of list words. In view of the support for complementarity that emerged, attention can now turn to testing theoretical explanations. Because complementarity was predicted by the process distinctions that originally predicted developmental reversals, an obvious approach would be (a) to determine whether those particular processes are actually tied to variations in complementarity and perhaps (b) to determine whether the processes posited in other accounts of developmental reversals in the DRM illusion (e.g., Howe, 2006; Metzger et al., 2008) are tied to variations in complementarity. Concerning b, we mentioned earlier that unlike FTT, these other accounts do not predict the complementarity phenomenon. However, it may be that proponents of those accounts will be able to elaborate their assumptions to explain complementarity after the fact. If that proves to be possible, it would be sensible to investigate whether complementarity varies as a function of the processes that are posited in those accounts.
Turning to the second suggestion, we investigated complementarity in the context of the DRM illusion because it is by far the most widely studied example of developmental reversals. As noted earlier, however, there are several other examples that involve quite different procedures, including ones that focus on remembering emotional events. A key reason that such varied paradigms have been studied is that developmental reversals are counterintuitive, and hence, it is essential to determine whether they are confined to the DRM paradigm or whether they can be detected with other procedures that satisfy the two theoretical conditions that first predicted them. Obviously, the same point applies to developmental complementarity. Similar to the case in the early years of research on developmental reversals, current evidence of developmental complementarity is confined to the DRM paradigm. Theoretically, complementarity may also occur with other paradigms that display developmental reversals. Whether it does is an open empirical question.
Finally, a measurement question should be briefly considered. In all of our experiments, the complementarity phenomenon was measured with a between-subjects procedure in which half the subjects judged whether test items were old and half judged whether the same items were newϪsimilar. Readers may be wondering whether complementarity might not be observed with a comparable within-subject procedure, in which each subject makes Complementary developmental trends in net memory accuracy when subjects judge whether old items and newϪsimilar items are old (black dots) versus when they judge whether the same items are newϪ similar (white squares). The net accuracy of old judgments is the probability of correctly recognizing list items as old divided by the sum of that probability and the probability of incorrectly recognizing newϪsimilar items as old. The net accuracy of newϪsimilar judgments is the probability of correctly recognizing newϪsimilar items as newϪsimilar divided by the sum of that probability and the probability of incorrectly recognizing list items as newϪsimilar. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
old judgments about half the items and newϪsimilar judgments about the other half. Insofar as children and adolescents are concerned, this remains an open question. However, the answer for adults is known. Recently, we reported a series of experiments in which complementarity was studied with both the between-and within-subject procedures (Brainerd & Reyna, 2018) . The basic phenomenon was detected with both procedures, and indeed, the observed levels of complementarity were similar.
